最高法院不应允许“抵制同性婚姻”

Professor Linda McClain weighs in on the Colorado wedding cake case in this POV for 但是今天.

On December 5, 2017, the Supreme Court heard 口头陈述 in 杰作蛋糕店诉科罗拉多州民权委员会案， in which baker (self-described cake artist) Jack Phillips, owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, asked the court to decide “whether applying Colorado’s public accommodations law to compel artists to create expression that violates their sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage violates the 第一修正案的言论自由或行使自由条款.”

菲利普斯对科罗拉多州上诉法院的裁决提出上诉，认为他违反了《科罗拉多州反歧视法》（CADA）中禁止基于性取向歧视的公共设施条款，因为他以自己对婚姻的宗教信仰为由，拒绝为查理·克雷格和大卫·马林斯的婚礼烤蛋糕。 科罗拉多州法院认为，拒绝菲利普斯豁免《加拿大残疾人法》并不违反他的第一修正案权利。 CADA, the court concluded, “creates a hospitable environment for all consumers,” which “防止经济和社会的巴尔干化盛行，当企业决定只服务于自己的同类。’”

The baker argued that he did not discriminate against Craig and Mullins because of their 性取向: he would have been happy to sell them any other baked good in his store. 相反，他拒绝了，因为为他们设计一个定制的婚礼蛋糕会迫使他“庆祝同性婚姻”，这违背了他的良心。 他“寻求与自己的宗教身份一致地过自己的生活，追求自己的职业，创作自己的艺术。”

Perhaps for strategic reasons, Phillips emphasized freedom of speech—freedom from compelled artistic expression—more than the 宗教信仰自由. 最高法院加强了对言论限制的审查； 相反，除非一项法律专门针对或单独针对宗教，否则法院在审查对宗教有附带影响的普遍适用的中立法律时，适用较低的审查标准。 The US Department of Justice (DOJ), in an unusual move, supports this “迫使表达式” argument.